Has the Logical Problem of Evil Been Solved?

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Well it is a great honor to give the Tanner-McMurrin annual lecture here at Westminster College. In addition, I have already benefited from the great hospitality shown to me by Dr. Popich. I can only wonder of the generosity of the Tanner family in endowing lectureships of this kind. It shows a cultural awareness, which is rare in our time. It has to be honored even more when it occurs. As Dr. Popich says, I have some books in Welsh; actually, that is where my best work is to be found. You have to read the Welsh books to really understand what I want to say. Failing I'm going to speak about some of the English works tonight and I'm going to speak about a question "Has the logical problem of evil been solved?" This is part of the first two chapters of a book, which I have just finished, called "The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God".

Now, most of this lecture is entirely negative so before you groan too loudly at that fact I wish to point out the reason why it's negative is that I want to try to put a stop to the way in which most philosophers of religion discuss the problem of evil today. To put it at its harshest, the problem of evil should be discussed with fear and trembling, because the way you discuss evil can actually add to the evil in the world; If you discuss it trivially. So it is a major question of how we should intellectually discuss the sufferings that so many people endure. Inevitably, because I give a lecture that is negative, people always suppress question from the audience is usually "What's your alternative?" Because I have been talking about a way I do not want philosophers to talk. Therefore, I will, at the end, give a brief indication of that alternative, but I warn you that is brief, for most of the time I shall brief on the attack against 90% of contemporary philosophy of religion on this issue. So has the logical problem of evil been solved? Let me remind you of what that logical problem is, I'm sure you know, but nevertheless let me remind you. It takes the form of a problematic triad of propositions. And it is held that these propositions are inconsistent; you cannot hold all three without inconsistency. To make them consistent you have to give up one of the three. The three propositions are these: God is omnipotent, God is all-powerful, second propositions, God is perfectly good, and the third propositions evil exists. And this logical problem of evil is quoted in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion when he quotes Epicurus' old question which goes like this: (and this is a question about God) Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? He is not impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing, whence then is evil? In other words, if God has the ability and the desire to do something about evil, why hasn't he done something about it?

Now in 20th century philosophy of religion, especially J.L. Mackey did more work on this traditional problem of evil. In addition, he said that these three propositions are not strictly inconsistent, that they are if we set out some further logical rules about the meaning of omnipotence, and I will say a little about that in the future, in a moment. Nelson Pike, he built on Mackey’s work and Alvin Plantinger built on Pike. So successful was all this work that my
colleague at Clairmont, Steven Davis, has said "It has been so successful that you no longer hear theist accused of the logical problem of evil. Plantinger, and others, that it’s no longer a problem have solved this logical problem so completely. I think that conclusion is a little premature. In fact, I am going to argue that not only has the logical problem of evil not been solved, it has not even got off the ground. That the two propositions, the first two propositions, cannot be sustained if you argue in the way in which most philosophers have done. I am going to show this in three contexts. Number 1, the proposition that God is omnipotent, why doesn't that get off the ground? Number 2, the proposition God is perfectly good; why does not that get off the ground. And the third, why does the appeal to hidden reasons that God may have for allowing evil, reasons we don't know about, why doesn't that get off the ground. That is going to be my strategy in the lecture.

So let us start with the first proposition, God is all-powerful, God is omnipotent. Mackey says that we have to introduce certain logical rules to make these propositions inconsistent, rules about omnipotence, for instance, what we mean by omnipotence. Now the first question I want to ask is this; where did these rules come from? We have to lay down some logical rules where did he find them. Well, he found them in the meaning of omnipotence, he looks up the meaning of omnipotence or rather, and he defines omnipotence. Ninety-Nine percent of philosophers today agree with this definition of omnipotence. Now the interesting thing about this definition is this: these philosophers want to understand what it means to speak about God's omnipotence; that is the aim. However, they know what omnipotence means without any reference to God at all. They do not look up `what do you mean by God's omnipotence,' they look up omnipotence. Then they say `as it happens, only God is omnipotent.’ However, they know the meaning of omnipotence without any reference to God whatsoever. Well what is the meaning of omnipotence? Mackey says, `the meaning of omnipotence, anyone who's omnipotent, can do any action which you can describe without any logical contradiction,' and professor Swinbern even says `what if we were omnipotent? Then if we were, we, you and I, we would be able to do any action, whatsoever, that you can describe without logical contradiction.

Now as it happens only God is omnipotent, but that's, that happens to be the case. However, the meaning of omnipotence does not depend on God. The meaning of omnipotence, I repeat again, is the ability to do any action describable without contradiction. Now how do we know when a description of an action is contradictory? Who is going to decide what is or is not a contradiction. Well, I hope you would agree with this, you would have to look at the context of what he said. You cannot describe them; you cannot decide that in the abstract. So you have to look at every specific context to find out whether an action, proposed in that context, is contradictory or not. So if you accept that, this is the new look of logical problem of evil, someone challenging, like old Epicurus did; this is how the challenge would look. If God is omnipotent, he can do any action which is describable without contradiction in its appropriate context. Second line of attack, there are millions, millions, and millions and millions of actions describable without contradiction in their appropriate context which it makes no sense to describe God doing. Therefore, God is not omnipotent, that would be the challenge. If there are millions of actions, and don't forget we are speaking of the first person of the trinity, God the father; the incarnation brings in special problems, and we've got enough problems for one night on our hands with this topic without bringing in the incarnation. So we are talking about God the father as is the proof; God the father. So the challenge are there actions in context which you
and I are quite familiar with, that we can describe without contradiction that it would make no sense to speak of God doing? There are millions of them, and I could get away with the rest of the lecture simply by going on giving you millions of examples, but just a few will do to disprove the proof. Here are some of them: riding a bicycle, licking a `Haagan-Daz' ice cream, bumping your head, learning Welsh, having sexual intercourse, forgetting things, being absent minding, you can go on forever. All those things we know those things; they are describable without contradiction. None of them makes sense when ascribed to the creator God. Therefore, God is not omnipotent. Do not forget, this only follows if you think omnipotence is doing whatever you can describe without contradiction. Well I can describe licking a Haagen-Dazs ice cream and riding a bicycle without contradiction. In addition, as the Calvinistic philosopher George Midroveze put it, with his usual caution, "it is probably true that God cannot ride a bicycle." Why? Because you need a body to ride a bicycle, a physical body. Now, professor Swinbern and Professor Davis sometimes express the point differently but only sometimes. In addition, it goes like this; this is Steve Davis, "God is omnipotent, if and only if for any logical possible state of affairs, such that the statement `God brings about that state of affairs' is coherent, God can bring about that state of affairs." Richard Swinbern, "God can do whatever is not logically impossible for him to do." Notice, now they are defining omnipotence as God is omnipotent means God can do whatever is not logically contradictory for God to do. They say that once each in their work. However, most of the times they lapse back into the other way of talking. However, notice the difference, in this second definition, you do not start with an abstract idea of omnipotence, you say `what do you mean by an omnipotent God?' You go to the religious context to look for the meaning. You do not start with I know what omnipotence is, can God do it? No, you ask, what does it mean to believe in an omnipotent God? the same problem occurs when you define omnipotence as the possession of all power. Steven Davis says, "God possess all the power there is." Again, it is purely abstract, you talk as if there is some one thing called power, and God has all of it. Does it make sense to ascribe all power to God? What is idolatry? Idolatry is ascribing the wrong power to God. That is essential part of idolatry. You cannot explain idolatry without bringing in the wrong ascription to God of a certain kind of power. The power of God is different from the power of the devil. As my teacher, Rush Rease said, "is God more powerful than the devil? Does he have more of what the devil has?" In which case Reese says, "I want to know what measure you are using." The powers of darkness are a kind of power. Does God have that power? Does goodness have the power of darkness? Evil is a power, does God have the power of evil? So power doesn't simply mean one thing; there are different kinds of power. And once you notice the logic of power differs from context to context, it no longer makes sense to ascribe all of that power to God. So within these terms of reference I want to argue 'God is omnipotent,' notice within these terms of reference, does not get off the ground. Why? God cannot do every action, which is describable without contradiction. Secondly, power is not one thing, so God cannot be said to have all of it. Third, if there are different kinds of power, it is obvious they cannot all be ascribed to God. There are not answers to all these objections, and probably tomorrow morning the panel is now working hard on thinking up terrible objections to what I am saying. However, I have not yet seen in the literature any answer to this kind of objection. Yet the way I have been attacking, and I'm not exaggerating, absolutely dominates the discussion of the problem of evil in contemporary philosophy of religion.
Let us move to the second proposition; God is perfectly good. Corresponding to an abstract concept of power, God is omnipotent; we also have in the literature a purely abstract conception of God's will. God's will is defined, as the power to do anything whatsoever that God wants to do. I am sorry I have that wrong, not what God wants to do; God's absolute will is God can do anything, anything. On this view then, God could ask me to murder my wife, betray my friends, and blaspheme against him. The objection in the literature is 'yes he can, it just so happens he doesn't want to.' That is the response, yes, God could ask you, murder your wife, and it's just that he doesn't feel like asking you to murder your wife or to betray your friends or to blaspheme against him. However, I suggest to you that that response is very inadequate, what we would actually say is that if someone said 'God has asked me to murder my wife,' we would say that is not a command from God. In other words, the notion of divine will is not abstract; it is not the will to do anything. I would put the opposite view in this way; God's nature is the grammar of God's will. If God's nature is love, than what God wills is within the parameters of his nature. God's nature is the grammar of God's will. It does not make sense to speak of God asking you to do anything whatsoever. Now why you might ask do philosophers want to hold on to the view that God could ask you to do anything? Well it is, because they have a confused conception of freedom of the will. They owe this, the contemporary philosopher that is; they owe this conception of freedom of the will to a definition of freedom of reaction given by Alvin Planttinger. This is his definition: he calls the person 's', "If a person, 's', is free with respect to any given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain. It is within his power to do the action at the time in question, and within his power to refrain." So his definition of a free action is if your action is free, you have it within your power to do it at the time you do the action, but you also have it within your power not to do it. Now that assumes that willing is always choosing. The assumption behind that analysis is that when you will to do something, you are always choosing between alternatives, or you are trying to do something. Now, if I have had a few drinks too many at the end of the day, I may be then be said to try to go home, I try to go home with some difficulty if I am inebriated. If I have had a rout, with my wife, I might say to her 'I'm not coming home tonight; I'm sleeping at the club.' When my wife is listening to me here, I cannot say we have never had a rout, but I have never slept at the club because I do not belong to any club. If I did belong to a club, I could say I choose to sleep in the club tonight, right, and I am not coming home. Ok, so sometimes I do try to get, well not often, but now and again, I try to go home with difficulty, or, I choose not to go home or I choose to go home. But I'm sorry to disappoint you, but at the end of most days, I just go home. I just go home, like you, just go home. You do not try to go home, you do not choose between alternatives to go home, you go home. As Wittgenstein said, 'because we concentrate on choosing and trying, we ignore the millions examples of willing, which are just doing, just doing.' You see, you could say God just loves. He simply loves, does not try to love, does not choose to love between love and hate, he loves. Once you get rid of the assumption that every time you will something, you must be choosing between alternatives, or trying hard to do it, then you see that a free action need not be one where you have it in you to do the opposite. That is rather important for ethics. Let us take one of my Welshmen, who have a common Welsh name, Mr. Jones. There are 25 pages in the phone book in Swansea of Jones, without addresses. Can you know what it is like to find a friend whose name is Jones? There are about 200 John Jones. Ok, Mr. Jones, let us take Mr.
Jones, who exercises a very simple act of virtue, he always pays his bills. Bill comes to the door, Mr. Jones says 'oh it's the gas bill,' he pays his bill. Simple, honest Mr. Jones always pays his bills. He is quite unlike Mr. Smith, who thinks about not paying his bills, though he does actually pay his bills in the end. He choosing to pay them, but he does not just pay them. He thinks about not paying them and then pays them, or Mr. Morgan who is far more tempted, who tries hard to pay his bills. If you accept Plantinger's definition of free action, then what if I write a reference for Mr. Jones according to Plantinger about Mr. Jones? this is what I'd have to say about virtuous Mr. Jones: Mr. Jones always pays his bills, but he has it in him not to pay them. Would Mr. Jones be pleased with that reference? I don't think so. I assure you Mr. Jones tries to pay his bills. No, Mr. Jones would not be satisfied with that reference. Mr. Jones chooses between alternatives, but in the end always pays his bills. No, he wouldn't be satisfied with that reference. Mr. Jones simply pays his bills. Plantinger's definition of freedom cannot capture the simplest acts of natural virtue. Think of the Good Samaritan. He saw the victim of the robbers in the ditch, how does the Bible put it, and immediately he was moved by compassion. He did not try to feel compassionate. We cannot say of the Good Samaritan, well he felt compassionate, but he had it in him to pass by over the other side. Now, that would not capture the Good Samaritan at all. He does not have it in him to pass by on the other side, which is what we admire about him. He is moved by compassion. Now when I read this paper at the University of Purdue, William Rowe, great champion of libertarian freedom said in that case, the Good Samaritan does not perform a free action. That is what happens to you when you are in the grip of a philosophical theory, you will not face reality. Nothing is more obvious than that the Good Samaritan freely went to the aid of the victim. No, sorry. Why? Did not choose between alternatives, did not have to struggle to do it. Just did it! That is what is marvelous about it! Two fathers playing with their children, one says 'well, it's six o'clock, time to play with the kids.' He has been reading Dr. Spock; it is a good thing to play with your children at six. All honor to him he plays with his children. However, think of another father, absorbed in playing with his children, absorbed in the play. Two different fathers; one does his duty at six. Quite enjoys playing, I am not taking anything from this person; it is better than not playing with your children at all. The other absorbed in play. Again, Plantinger's definition of freedom makes it impossible to account for the Good Samaritan. And what William Rowe said in order to show, to rescue his theory, he said, 'well, the good Samaritan, this wasn't the first time he passed by a victim in the ditch. Suddenly, the Good Samaritan becomes an Aristotelian Good Samaritan. He passes by lots of victims in the ditch. Sometimes he walks by, then other days he says 'oh I shouldn't do that' but he still walks by, then the third time he grudgingly helps. Then he sees how much he is needed; so next time he helps a little more readily. Until by the time he was walking by when the bible saw him, he did it straight off. If that is not true, William Rowe said, the bible is not speaking about a free action. It was an Aristotelian Good Samaritan who built up slowly to this act of compassion; that is not what admires. He was immediately moved by compassion. You are walking along the street, little child trips and falls in front of you. Oh, gosh what are you going to do now? Are you going to struggle to pick up this little kid with a cut on his leg? No, you pick him up, simple act of virtue. But you had it in you to let him stay there and bleed. What sort of analysis of the free act would that be? It's hopeless. And yet philosophers, as Wittgenstein said, 'there's no obstacle of the intellect, the example I've given you is not difficult, there is no obstacle of the intellect; it's an obstacle of the will. You will not
let the theory go.’ Wittgenstein said ‘if you could convince Freud that not all dreams are sexual, supposing you could convince Freud.’ "You know, Freud, I really do dream about railway stations sometimes, I really do.” Supposing you could get Freud to agree, ‘ok, all dreams are not sexual,’ what would be Freud’s reaction? Ok not all dreams are sexual. What are all dreams then? They must all be something, the desire for a unified theory. Ok, they are not all sexual, what are they then, all of them? You will not let go of that all. The desires for one general answer. Wittgenstein called it the 'craving for generality.' For some people, certain things are just ruled out morally, that is just the kind of people they are, and we admire of them for it. At Clairmont, there was a Kantian teaching there, I don't know if you've read any of Hilary Box's works on ethics, she's a Kantian, and holds the view there must be a choice between alternatives for an action to be free. So in order to try to shock her out of this in discussion, I said 'look, I can't say I've never acted badly towards my mother. But I can honestly say, never thought of strangling her. I really didn't, Hilary, please believe me. I've never though of strangling my mother.” Now she was in a Kantian bind, because if I have not thought of strangling my mother, I needed the alternative, right, she said, "Well, the thought was in your mind, but only fleetingly.” So now, I have to describe myself like this: I only fleetingly thought of strangling my mother. It is hopeless. If you are wedded to the view that whatever you do freely, you must always have considered the opposite, it's just not true. Well you do that, I want to expand my business, but in order to expand your business you must put your friend out of business. It is the most economical way of expanding your business and it is legal. I would say, "that's out.” I am not doing it. Now some people, will consider it, and still say it is out. However, that does not capture the person who simply says that is out, and does not consider it. That is important in the model assessment of that person.

I come now to the third proposition, and this is the most popular in the literature namely that the logical problem of evil is easily answered because God has reasons for allowing evil that we know nothing about. Now, by the way, this is called a defense of God. A difference between a defense and a theodicy is this: a theodicy, like Professor Swinberns. Actually tells you what God's reasons are. Why does God give you cancer? Well it is a ways of toughening up your character and seeing how resolute you can be in face of suffering. I will discuss these reasons, and I have mapped them out. That is not my main attack tonight. My main attack tonight is a defense, which says we do not know the reasons. That since it is logically possible that God has hidden reasons do justify the evil, therefore evil does not count against God. Because, exhyposthesis, he may have reasons that we do not know about and our finite minds cannot grasp them, etc. etc. that would justify him in allowing evil. As Plantinger puts it, why should he tell us why he has allowed it? That is Plantinger's short answer. It is hubris to want to know why God has allowed it. Therefore, faith is saved by what we do not know. My reply is, faith is condemned by what we do know. Let what God allows be the holocaust, one of the most horrendous evils in the history of human beings. Now, it is sad to say that in the literature that people move on to the discussion of the holocaust as if it were in the same logical sphere as the most trivial examples. I will not name the philosopher, I am not here to call names, but a famous philosopher juxtaposes the holocaust with taking his son to the dentist. He puts it like this; he has a rather harrowing description of taking his son to the dentist, which I do not think many of us would condone. Anyway, he puts it like this: I allow the dentist to inflict suffering on my son. Most of us say I am taking him to have his tooth fixed, right. I mean, it is a bit of a
harrowing description. “Well son, I'm taking you now to the dentist to allow the dentist to inflict suffering on you.” However, you know, it is bad enough getting them to the dentist in the first place, without describing it in such a harrowing way. Anyway, you take him there and the dentist inflicts pain, but of course, the tooth is saved; so the health of the child justifies the suffering and later in life the child will thank you, he's got nice teeth and “thank you dad for taking me to the dentist.”

It is with the holocaust. When we reach the ascidians, the glory will be such that it will pale into insignificance when we see why it was allowed.” I am not making that up. Almost pick up any book on the problem of evil, you will find this mode of argument. My question is this, does God allow the holocaust without a second a though, or after a second thought? It is important that I remind you at this stage, for people who argue in this way, God is conceived of as a moral agent in exactly the same sense that we are moral agents. That is part of this tradition; God is an ordinary moral agent. I do not think he is, but that is another story. Within the tradition, I am talking about; he is conceived. If therefore God allows the holocaust without a second thought, our common moral understanding has a word for that: callous, brutal, insensitive to human suffering. However, what if God allows it after a second thought and the second thought is the plan, whatever is going to be, which you do not know about. By the way, 90% of people who are writing about the problem of evil are consequentiality in ethics; the end justifies the means. Ninety Percent are religious utilitarian, the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the ascidians. It is just a religious version of utilitarianism. Ok, so you do not know the reasons. Some have argued, for all we know, this glory that we all want necessitated the holocaust. We do not know how of course, but that is the assumption. For all we know it did. Therefore, because you do not know that it did not, you can hold on to your faith and believe that God had to do it in order to bring about the glory that you would be glad to inherit. I mean, I don't think fine, but supposing I thought fine, I think it is horrendous already, but supposing I went along with that, what does common moral understanding say about God? Do not forget, the proposition being defended is God is perfectly good. You cannot get there. Even if you allow that God had to do what he had to do common moral understanding would then say God has been involved in a moral tragedy; he had to do it. Do you remember “Sophie’s Choice?” Where the Gestapo officer who makes her chooses which of her children to hand over degrades her or he will kill both. Does she say she did the right thing? No. She says, “I did what I had to do.” She never forgives herself; she ends up by taking her own life. She is involved in a moral tragedy. Can you imagine any moral agent in the ordinary understanding of moral agency saying, "I had to allow a holocaust to bring about this glory, but I'm morally perfect.” It makes no moral sense whatsoever, in terms of ethics. When we are involved in moral tragedies, we come out with dirty hands. If God is to be thought of in this way, even KaramatzoF says, "I respectfully return you the ticket. I know you had to do it, but I respectfully return you the ticket." Bernard Williams talks about the usual example of somewhere in some country or other, not a civilized place like England, but somewhere else, there are ten prisoners lined up and you arrive and the captain says to you “You choose which one is to die. You choose which one you are going to shoot or I'll shoot the ten.” One of my teachers said "One thing I know about a saint, he wouldn't shoot the one.” It is hard to know what he would do, not pretending there is any easy answers. One thing you know, he would not shoot the one. Appeal to ignorance does not work. It does not work, because if God does what he has to do, even if you allow that, you
cannot keep perfection in tact.

Ok, so I have looked at the three propositions, God is omnipotent, God is perfectly good, and God has reasons you do not know about which justifies everything that happens. You cannot get out of it. It seems to me, a God worthy of worship. Yet it is within these parameters that the problem of evil is discussed today. This is where I try to ask, what is the alternative, then?

The book I have written is in three parts: Problematic inheritance, interlude, and a neglected inheritance. I am talking now about a neglected inheritance, where I think about religion very differently. And I think about it in this way: religion asks you to think about the world, good and evil, in a certain way. It doesn't build up a character reference from God from the bottom up. Look at this, and, look at that minus, how is he doing now? It offers you a certain conception of the love of God and says, "can you believe in that despite everything?" Not in terms of means and ends, but does that love have a point for you despite everything. Can you find some sense in love despite how the world treats it? Religious people, some at least, look at nature, look at other human beings, and are stuck by the sheer givenness of human life. They see it under the aspect of a gift. Another way of speaking about that gift is they see it as grace. It is absurd for me to say, "I deserve to be alive." What did I do to deserve to be alive? Here I am. Some of you may wish, well we will not go into that. Here I am, deserved. It is that terrible but penetrating remark by Tallyhoing when the beggar said to him, "Sir, I need to live." asking for bread. He said to him, "I see no necessity for that." The cosmos do not owe us anything: it is like a gift. Love is a gift. Do you deserve to be loved? If you are loved, it is a gift; it is a grace. In the second half of the book, I say that grace is a synonym for God. For example, I can know Winston Churchill without knowing he was the prime minister. However, if I know God at the same time I know grace; grace is related to God like face, hands, feet, and body is related to human being. It is a logical, internal relationship between the concept of grace and the concept of God. If you look at other human beings of the world as a grace, you cease to be the center of the world. You die to the self, to self-centeredness. What about what the world does for you, and does to you? Well, in Kirkregards, "Impunity of Heart", speaks about Christian patience. Not in the sense of be patient about it, patience in the sense of waiting on love. Terrible things are done to people. The terror of what is done cannot be explained without also mentioning the good things that are violated. The victims of those atrocities have sometimes said, not easily, that those good things have not lost their point because other human beings violated them. In Christianity, at the heart of that, is the crucifixion. Where you see what can happen to love. I take the crucifixion and the notion of sacrifice very serious. I do not know if any of you have gone to see "the Passion of Christ". You can ask me questions about that tomorrow morning; I will not discuss it now. At least one thing that film brings out, it is a very Catholic film. However, one thing that film brings out very strongly is you could not say in the Eucharist, "this is my body severely damaged for you." No, "this is my body broken for you." Broken; Jesus is broken, "My God, why have you forsaken me?" And at the heart of Christianity is a very harsh truth. That you are shown the extremity of love and the price of that is the person, through whom it is shown, maybe Jesus, is not sustained by it in the end. He is broken, sacrificed, it means, what it says. Therefore, at the end of the book, I have to face the most difficult question of all. I may go through lots of suffering and somehow or other, a believer would say by the grace of God, I do not fail to see a point in love. Supposing I am crushed; actually crushed, what
does it mean to say that God is still with the person whose been crushed. It cannot mean God sustains that person, because I am talking about cases where the person is crushed, broken, not sustained by any story. What does it mean then to say that God is with the person? It is extremely important that we do not lie about situations like that. It is extremely important we do not sentimentalize them. In addition, the only answer I can come up with is this they have their story. It is not a story that sustains them Jesus is broken. However, you cannot take his story away from him, not a story that sustains him, but the story of his being broken. That is his story. Now of course survivors of the holocaust say quite rightly it's important that we remember the holocaust, we remember what happened. Tell the story; tell it over and over again. However, I would end with this comment. Their story, though it is important to say it again, doesn't depend on it being said again, because the world can forget anyone. If the whole world forgot them, the one thing the world cannot take away from them is their story. If it is a story of love broken, by the world, the value of that story, their story, does not depend on our remembering it. The religious expression of that is to say the world does not listen, but God does. Thank you very much for your attention.